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The changing nature of financial intermediation  




Monetary policy influences the economy through its effects on credit conditions facing 
households and firms, for example, the interest rates available on bank deposits and bank 
loans, and the cost of capital for firms, be it in the form of bank credit, debt issued on the 
capital market, or equity. While it is convenient for analytical purposes to assume that the 
monetary authority controls the relevant credit conditions directly through its control of a 
short-term policy interest rate, this simplification leaves no role for a banking system or for 
financial intermediation more generally. It thus precludes an analysis of how changes in the 
nature of financial intermediation may impact the conduct of monetary policy. 
This paper builds on a relatively recent but growing literature which puts financial 
intermediation and financial intermediaries back into macroeconomic models and attempts to 
draw some conclusions about how central bank policy may need to adjust to accommodate 
changes in the structure of financial intermediation. It starts by documenting the evolution of 
financial intermediaries and financial intermediation as observed mainly in developed 
economies, although arguably this will become a feature of emerging-market and developing 
economies as well. It is suggested that the traditional distinction between bank-based and 
market-based financial systems is becoming outdated and should be replaced by a 
distinction between relationship-based and arm’s length interaction between borrowers and 
lenders. Developments also suggest that markets are becoming more complete and that risk 
management and distribution by both institutions and households is becoming more efficient. 
Implications of these developments for monetary policy are discussed in Sections 2 and 3. In 
the former it is briefly pointed out that central bank operating procedures will be made more 
flexible as financial markets develop, allowing central banks that are currently still 
constrained to using direct instruments of monetary control to switch to more efficient indirect 
policy instruments. 
Section 3 discusses the implications for a central bank’s interest rate policy. It is argued that 
changes in the nature of financial intermediation may alter the neutral interest rate a central 
bank should aim for as well as the horizon at which it seeks to achieve the inflation target. 
Furthermore, a case can be made that movements in asset prices and balance sheet 
aggregates may provide information that is useful for setting monetary policy. 
1.  Transformation of financial intermediation 
1.1  What do financial intermediaries do? 
The simplest view of financial intermediation is that it serves to transfer financial resources 
from net savers in an economy to net investors. While it is of course true that this is an 
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important function of financial intermediaries, this description suggests a far too limited role 
for intermediation in financial markets, since it emphasises only net financial flows. A more 
complete picture would reveal that net savers in an economy are often both sources and 
recipients of funds from intermediaries and likewise for net investors. The same household 
will typically have deposits with a bank or mutual fund while at the same time holding a 
significant mortgage liability. Similarly a firm may be issuing equity shares or commercial 
paper to finance its operations, even as it has substantial financial asset holdings through an 
internally managed pension fund. The recent growth in securitisation has also led to the 
emergence of financial institutions that intermediate between other financial intermediaries. 
In an international context current account positions and net international investment 
positions of economies are often dwarfed by gross financial flows and gross claims and 
debts, again an illustration of a wider role of financial intermediation than matching only 
excess demands and excess supplies of funds. 
One aspect of the value-added of a financial intermediary is that it transforms assets in 
several dimensions; in terms of size when it combines small denomination deposits into large 
loans, in terms of credit quality when it adds its name to portfolios of loans to make them 
more readily acceptable to investors, in terms of maturity by accepting short-term liabilities as 
counterparts to long-term loans, and in terms of currency composition when it borrows 
abroad in foreign currency and extends domestic-currency loans. Each of these 
transformations will of course entail its own specific risk – liquidity risk, credit risk, interest 
risk, or currency risk – and the intermediary will have to manage these risks.  
One strand of the literature on financial intermediation has devoted considerable attention to 
the question of why financial intermediation is carried out indirectly by specific institutions 
rather than directly by corresponding markets. At the most general level the answer lies in 
differential transaction costs between the two modes of intermediation. More specifically, 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders is often invoked as a reason for the 
emergence of specialised intermediation institutions. This asymmetric information can 
potentially lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems which require screening of 
borrowers, preventing opportunistic behaviour, as well as verification of the outcome of 
projects for which a loan has been extended. Significant economies of scale in these 
monitoring functions can explain the existence of specialist lending institutions. Furthermore, 
economies of scope between deposit taking and lending activities can explain the 
emergence of traditional banks. 
In light of this brief description, changes in the financial intermediation landscape can be due 
to the introduction of both new institutions and new instruments. The underlying causes of 
such changes can be traced to changes in legislation, technological developments, 
theoretical developments, and even the choice of monetary policy strategy itself. Examples 
of legislation-driven financial liberalisation include relieving banks from the obligation to lend 
to “priority” sectors, allowing foreign financial institutions to operate in the economy, 
extending the range of instruments in which insurance companies may invest, etc. 
Improvements in information technology and theoretical advances in asset pricing have led 
to the invention of a vast number of new financial instruments and their use in investment 
strategies and risk management. This in turn has permitted the transfer of risk with 
implications for incentives to monitor borrowers, for the dynamics of price adjustments in 
financial markets, and ultimately for financial and macroeconomic stability, i.e. for outcomes 
with which central banks are principally concerned. The influence of the choice of monetary 
policy strategy on the development of financial markets refers to the possibility that the 
adoption of a particular operating procedure for monetary policy will have a direct influence 
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1.2  A brief review of recent developments 
During the past few decades significant development of financial intermediaries, financial 
instruments and financial markets has taken place, driven largely by deregulation, 
technological advancement and rapid globalisation. As a result, financial intermediation has 
also undergone remarkable changes, more so in developed countries but also in emerging 
economies. These changes have provided diverse choices and opportunities for households 
and firms in terms of their borrowing and financing as well as lending and investment 
decisions. For example, firms have been able to resort increasingly to bond and stock 
markets to obtain funds while households could begin to diversify their portfolios out of bank 
deposits into securities, mutual funds and derivatives. 
One strand of the literature on financial intermediation compares the relative merits of bank-
based financial systems, where banks play a leading role in mobilising savings, evaluating 
investments and managing risks, versus market-based systems, where capital markets are 
just as important in performing these roles (Levine and Zervos (1998)). In the traditional 
financial system, banks’ intermediation can be described as simply transforming deposits into 
illiquid loans, and hence there was a clear separation between banks and markets. However, 
recent financial innovation and the development of non-bank intermediaries, as well as the 
creation of new instruments and new markets, have resulted in a breakdown of the clear 
separation between banks and markets. 
A growing literature goes beyond the bank-based vs. market-based distinction, and 
characterises financial intermediation based on how financial transactions are conducted. In 
this literature, relationship-based intermediation, which depends on a long-term relationship 
and the sharing of private information between the borrower and the lender, is contrasted 
with arm’s length intermediation, which depends on publicly available information and 
contract enforcement. Financial deregulation and innovation have blurred the borders 
between commercial banking and other financial activities such as investment banking and 
asset management, and the roles of financial markets and banks in both households’ and 
firms’ financing and asset allocation have become more integrated. In view of these 
developments, we could look at financial intermediation by differentiating the system into 
relationship-based traditional business by banks, arm’s length based intermediation by 
financial institutions, and intermediation through capital markets. Despite the varying pace of 
developments and important differences across countries (and regions), several general 
trends in financial intermediation can be observed. 
First, most countries are seeing a declining role of relationship-based banking activity. While 
banks have traditionally played a very important role in channelling funds from savers to 
borrowers, and they remain the most important single source of finance in many countries, 
their role in intermediation has declined. For major OECD countries, on average, banks 
intermediated less than 30% of non-financial sector (including household, non-financial 
corporate, and government) assets and liabilities in 2004.
2 Even in countries where banks 
still account for a higher share in intermediation, the importance of relationship-based 
banking business should be weakened by the observed trend of intense competition in the 
banking industry and increased credit information availability and information disclosure.  
Second, many countries are seeing an increase in the importance of arm’s length financial 
intermediations, which include activities by non-bank intermediaries such as pension funds, 
mutual funds and insurance companies, non-traditional banking activities such as banks 
borrowing from and lending to non-bank institutions, and activities related to financial 
innovations and new risk-management practices such as loan securitisation and trades of 
derivative products. Recent developments in these areas have resulted in more complete 
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financial intermediations, allowing agents to insure and diversify a broader range of risks and 
allowing risks to be transferred to parties who are willing to assume them. 
Non-bank intermediaries are generally found to be performing an increasing role in 
channelling funds between savers and borrowers (in advanced economies). In the US, 
around 50% of households’ assets are held with non-bank financial institutions.
3 Improvements 
in information technology have also lowered transaction costs and allowed more accurate 
risk assessment by non-bank intermediaries, resulting in more loan originations which have 
eroded banks’ traditional lending role. In response to such competition, banks have 
diversified their lines of business and expanded to off-balance sheet and non-interest income 
activities as mentioned above. A notable example is the rapid development of the asset-
backed securities market, where banks originate, pool and distribute credit risks by 
repackaging a portfolio of debt instruments (such as collateralised debt obligations) and 
selling them to different investors such as insurance and fund management companies. 
Moreover, with the expansion of financial instruments and services, domestic financial 
institutions have become increasingly interdependent, as reflected in the increase in the 
shares of both banks’ liabilities and assets vis-à-vis non-bank financial institutions (in 
advanced economies). It is common for banks to borrow from or lend to other institutions, or 
own securities issued by other institutions, or have other institutions as counterparties in 
various financial contracts they possess. By contrast, in a traditional financial system, 
domestic financial institutions tended to be rather insulated from one another as banks, 
insurance companies and brokerage firms each operated in relatively separate markets and 
managed different products. It is also worth mentioning that national markets are also 
increasingly interlinked with global markets through increased cross-border borrowing and 
lending by various financial institutions. 
Third, stock and debt securities markets in most countries have achieved remarkable 
development over the past decades, becoming significant sources of finance for firms and 
investment vehicles for households. In countries like the US, debt and equity of non-financial 
corporates as a percentage of non-financial corporates’ total liabilities reached about 70% in 
2004, indicating a dominant role of capital markets in providing financing for firms.
4 While the 
pace of developments varies significantly across countries and across markets, in part 
depending on the institutional infrastructure (such as protection of legal rights, enforcement 
mechanisms and other factors such as information disclosure and accounting standards), in 
general, most countries have seen improved market access, with firms more easily able to 
obtain external financing and increasing numbers of listed companies. Domestic bond and 
stock markets have also increased their liquidity and depth, as reflected in higher transaction 
volumes and rising market capitalisation and turnovers. 
In view of the obvious importance of financial markets for the transmission of monetary 
policy, it is natural to ask how the conduct of such policy might be affected by the ongoing 
transformation of financial intermediation. There are two aspects to this question; operational 
on the one hand and strategic on the other.
5 The next two sections deal with each in turn. 
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2.  Financial intermediation and monetary policy operating 
procedures 
This section looks briefly at the relationship between changes in the structure of financial 
intermediation and operational aspects of monetary policy.
6 The focus will be on the choice 
of policy instrument and the interaction between operating procedures and financial 
structure. 
The most basic distinction to be made is between direct and indirect instruments of monetary 
policy. Where financial markets are primitive, the central bank may not be able to influence 
credit conditions other than by setting targets for bank lending, using liquidity ratios to steer 
lending towards “priority” sectors, setting reserve ratios, and imposing similar more or less 
quantitative restrictions on the ability of banks to intermediate credit. As financial markets 
develop, greater use of indirect policy measures can be made. Operations in the domestic 
interbank market or a short-term bills market will be possible, and when a liquid market for 
government bonds at a variety of tenures has been established, the central bank could even 
contemplate operating at different segments of the maturity structure. It is tempting, but not 
correct (see Archer (2006)), to think of the switch from using direct instruments to market-
based ones as being dictated by an exogenously determined pace of reform of financial 
markets. Rather, the reforms and changes in operating procedures often appear to be 
mutually reinforcing. As a central bank starts to conduct, say, open market operations in 
central bank bills, the financial system adjusts and develops so that trading in secondary 
markets becomes more active, which in turn makes the conduct of open market operations 
increasingly effective. 
The exact form the implementation of indirect monetary policy takes varies across countries 
depending on the specificity of the market structure that has emerged. For example, while 
most financially highly developed economies have carried out open market operations using 
central bank or government liabilities, the Swiss National Bank for many years did so using 
repurchase agreements in the foreign exchange market. The reason was simply that this 
market was very much more liquid and could therefore transmit policy impulses more reliably. 
Unorthodox as it may have been, the practice of carrying out monetary policy through the 
foreign exchange market does not appear to have materially altered its effectiveness in terms 
of influencing credit conditions in the economy. 
As a first approximation, when different segments of the financial markets are highly 
integrated with each other there is a presumption that the impact of central bank actions on 
the structure of interest rates is independent of which segment of the market the central bank 
is targeting for intervention. This seems to be the view adhered to in a majority of central 
banks in jurisdictions with well developed markets, as they predominantly conduct policy 
using short-term instruments. 
In developing and emerging markets the choice of instrument is arguably more important. 
First of all, the graduation from conducting policy based on direct controls to using indirect 
instruments is important as it spreads the effect of policies more evenly across institutions 
and markets and reduces the arbitrariness often associated with direct controls. Furthermore, 
as the choice of indirect policy instrument has an impact on the liquidity and breadth of the 
chosen segment of the market, the central bank has an important role to play in supporting 
the development of the financial sector of the economy. 
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3. Monetary  policy  when  financial intermediation is taken seriously: 
is the “Taylor rule” enough? 
The main focus of this paper is on how the introduction of financial intermediaries into the 
analysis of monetary policy influences the conclusions we draw as to the appropriate conduct 
of such policy. We start by reviewing briefly three analytical frameworks that contain an 
explicit role for financial intermediation in otherwise standard macroeconomic models. That is 
followed by a stylised representation of these frameworks which allows us to point to the key 
relationship that distinguishes models that allow for a role of financial intermediation and 
those that assume that the central bank has full control of credit conditions. After a review of 
empirical evidence on this relationship, we discuss the implication for monetary policy by 
asking whether the well known Taylor rule provides a sufficient benchmark against which an 
effective monetary policy can be judged. 
3.1  Three models of financial intermediation 
(i)  Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 
Bernanke and Blinder introduce a distinction between interest rates on bank loans and bonds 
in a simple macro model to explore the implications of a credit market for aggregate demand. 
They extend the standard IS/LM model by adding bank loans as a third asset in addition to 
money and bonds.
7 Their specification of the demand for loans by firms and the supply of 
credit by banks leads to an equilibrium in which the interest rate on bank loans can differ 
from the policy interest rate depending on the state of the business cycle (because this is 
one of the determinants of the demand for loans by firms), on the portfolio preferences of 
households (because they influence the supply of deposits to banks), and on parameters 
such as reserve requirements that determine the cost of bank intermediation. Although the 
authors do not explore the effects of changes in the intermediation technology of banks, their 
model implies that changes in this technology would alter the equilibrium relationship 
between the two interest rates. 
The implication of this model for the conduct of monetary policy is that the central bank 
needs to monitor shocks in the market for bank loans and react to these shocks in order to 
stabilise output and inflation, and it needs to be mindful of possible changes in the 
equilibrium real policy rate brought about by changes in the bank intermediation process. 
(ii)  The financial accelerator model
8 
The financial accelerator is based on the fact that credit markets are imperfect due to the 
existence of asymmetric information and costly monitoring of borrowers by lenders. As a 
result, a firm that wants to borrow on the market will have to pay a premium over the 
opportunity cost of internally generated funds. The size of the premium depends, inter alia, 
on the size of the collateral the firm is able to post, the size of its cash flows, and the 
monitoring technology available to the borrower. 
It is not difficult to grasp intuitively why the effect of a shock in the economy on the business 
cycle should be amplified in this context. A negative shock to consumption, say, would 
reduce cash flows of firms, which in turn would increase their external finance premium. 
                                                  
7   Brunner and Meltzer and Tobin had earlier emphasised the importance of assets other than money and bonds 
for the monetary transmission mechanism. See, for example, Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Tobin (1969). 
Meltzer (1995) contains an accessible survey. 
8   See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Bernanke et al (1996) and (1999). 106  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
Facing a higher cost of borrowing, firms would cut back on investment, which would lead to a 
further reduction in demand and productive capacity. Similarly, an increase in asset prices 
would lead to a reduction in borrowing costs due to the increased value of firms’ collateral 
and could therefore have a larger effect on aggregate output than one would expect based 
only on a wealth effect on consumption. The size of the effect of monetary policy on output 
would likewise be amplified as the initial impact on cash flows and net worth would influence 
the external finance premium and lead to further changes in firms’ investments. 
For our purposes the existence of a financial accelerator means that monetary policy is more 
potent, and that variables governing the financial intermediation process may have an 
independent influence on aggregate demand over and above that of monetary policy interest 
rates.
9 
(iii)  Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) 
Goodfriend and McCallum explore the quantitative implications of a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the new Keynesian variety in which a banking sector 
has been incorporated and given a non-trivial role as a financial intermediary. In the model, 
banks serve an essential function since their monetary deposit liabilities are required for 
consumption goods purchases by consumers, and their loans are required to finance the 
hiring of capital by entrepreneurs. Loan management by banks requires labour inputs and 
collateral in the form of government bonds and capital. Financial intermediation is hence 
modelled as an economic activity that requires real resources and is subject to technological 
progress and shocks. The specification implies that different assets yield different returns in 
equilibrium. Government bonds require a lower rate of return than capital because they 
provide greater collateral services in the loan management function of banks. Interbank 
deposits, identified as a policy interest rate, yield a lower rate still because of the resource 
costs associated with banks’ lending to entrepreneurs. 
As in the case of the two previous analytical frameworks, the Goodfriend-McCallum model 
implies that there will be a wedge between the central bank’s policy rate and the interest 
rates that determine households’ and firms’ intertemporal expenditure decisions. This wedge 
is not constant but will depend, inter alia, on banks’ intermediation technology (“loan 
management” technology in their terminology) and on the cost of inputs, labour and capital in 
the intermediation process. Goodfriend and McCallum show that for plausible 
parameterisation of their model the nature of financial intermediation will have quantitatively 
significant influences on both the steady state equilibrium value of the policy interest rate and 
the nature of the dynamic adjustment of inflation and consumption to shocks. 
3.2  An illustrative analytic framework 
We next ask whether and how the central idea in the above models – that the interest rate 
relevant for aggregate demand can differ from the monetary policy interest rate depending on 
the state of the economy and on the nature of the financial intermediation process – 
influences the analysis of monetary policy. For the sake of concreteness the discussion will 
be framed in a simple analytical model commonly used to discuss monetary policy. It 
contains just four equations, but the general conclusions that will be extracted from it will 
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apply to more complete settings. For simplicity it abstracts from open-economy 
considerations.
10 
The model consists of an aggregate supply relationship, or Phillips curve 
π ε + α + = π t t t ygap 2 ..... , (1) 
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As these equations are well known, only brief comments on each of them will be given, 
focusing on issues that are relevant for the potential impact of changes in the nature of 
financial intermediation. As a first general remark it should be kept in mind that the dynamic 
aspects in the equations are kept very simple for ease of notation. It is quite possible that 
some or all of the α:s, β:s, γ:s, and δ:s would be functions of a lag operator, in which case 
these functions might be influenced by changes in the financial system. This possibility, 
which is illustrated by the series of dots (…..) in the equations, will be discussed in the next 
section. 
With regard to the aggregate supply, or Phillips curve, equation (equation (1)) the only 
remark is that in some specifications, the output gap measure is replaced by a measure of 
the marginal cost of production. In this case, and where the marginal cost of production 
would include costs of capital or financing of purchases of intermediate goods, the relevant 
borrowing costs would be included as a direct determinant of current, and hence expected 
future, inflation. As these borrowing costs would influence the aggregate demand equation in 
the model, we leave them out of equation (1) for simplicity. 
The aggregate demand equation depends on the nominal rate of interest on bank loans, i
l, 
adjusted by the corresponding expected inflation rate to obtain a measure of the real cost of 
bank credit to households and firms. In addition, to allow for other forms of financial 
intermediation than through banks, aggregate demand is assumed to depend on a set of 
variables, zt, which are meant to capture the cost and availability of these alternative sources 
of credit for households and firms.
11 It is through these variables that the effect of changes in 
the structure of financial intermediation will have most of its impact in our model, and 
therefore potentially on the conduct of monetary policy. 
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Equation (3) represents a standard reaction function of the central bank which sets the policy 
interest rate in response to the output gap and to deviations of expected inflation from the 
target rate at horizon h, as suggested by the well known Taylor rule. 
Finally, there is a relationship between the nominal interest rate on bank loans which 
determines spending and the nominal policy rate. As written, this relationship will be able to 
illustrate the consequences of a variety of models of financial intermediation. For example, if 
the liabilities of the central bank and bank loans are perfect substitutes then δ1=1 and δ2=0 
so that i
p and i
l will be equal, and the term β4zt will be redundant in the aggregate demand 
relationship, in which case the central bank has perfect control over the borrowing conditions 
for households and firms. If i
l represents a long-term interest rate and i
p a short rate, and if 
the expectations theory of the term structure links the two perfectly, then the x variables in 
equation (4) contain expected future values of the policy interest rate. In neither of these 
cases will the structure of financial intermediation have any impact on the determination of 
output and inflation in our model because the central bank can set the relevant interest rate 
directly. So the only interesting case for the purpose of this paper is when either (or both) 
bank loans and alternative sources of private sector credit are not perfect substitutes with 
central bank liabilities. In this case a model for the determinants of their relationship will 
include some additional variables summarised in the vector x in equation (4). 
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which shows that aggregate demand will depend on the nature of the financial intermediation 
process through the variables in x and through 
m i
t ε . Furthermore, it is convenient to “solve” 
the equations for inflation and output in terms of the underlying disturbances in the economy 
as in (5) and (6). 
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where it should be understood that the functions include past and expected future values of 
the ε:s in addition to current values. The point of this last expression is to make explicit that 




ε ε ) are part of the solution for inflation and 
output, contrary to the common specification where the policy interest rate enters directly into 
the aggregate demand equation. 
It is also useful to characterise the equilibrium real interest rate on bank loans as well as the 
equilibrium policy rate. Solving (4) for the bank loan rate when the output gap is zero and the 
inflation rate is at the target level gives 
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Hence, in the policy reaction function we must have  
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in order for a stationary equilibrium to be attained. In words, the so called “neutral” level of 
the policy interest rate depends on features of the financial intermediation process through 
the variables x and z. For example, suppose risk aversion or the perceived credit risk 
associated with lending to firms or households increases. This will lead to an increase in the 
spread between the risk-free short-term policy rate and the longer-term interest rate on 
loans. As far as investment or consumption decisions are concerned, monetary conditions 
have tightened. To maintain a neutral monetary policy stance, the policy rate should decline. 
Similarly, a structural change in the financial intermediation sector that reduces the costs of 
financial intermediation implies easier monetary conditions unless it is counteracted by an 
increase in the policy rate. 
This conclusion is a special case of that reached by Svensson (2003) in his analysis of the 
use of “judgement” by monetary policy makers. Svensson introduces judgement in inflation 
and output equations by adding variables he refers to as the “deviation”. Apart from 
differences in lag structures these variables are identical to those I have labelled x and z in 
equations (2) and (4). This means that what Svensson calls a central banker’s “judgement” 
can be thought of as referring to the use of a more elaborate or different (hence his term 
“deviation”) model than the bare-bones structure involving only the output gap, the inflation 
rate, and the policy interest rate which is so popular in analytical treatments of monetary 
policy. Not surprisingly, Svensson concludes that the additional variables (judgement) should 
be allowed to play a role in the setting of a central bank’s monetary policy instrument. In the 
context where financial intermediaries are an important element of the economy, the 
implication is that the nature of the financial intermediation sector should have an impact on 
the conduct of monetary policy as I have argued above. 
3.3 Empirical  issues 
That the financial sector has an influence on how monetary policy affects the economy is well 
established both empirically and theoretically.
12 But in order to assess the implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy it is important to distinguish between three ways in which this 
influence can manifest itself. First, the size and speed of the response of aggregate demand 
to changes in market interest rate and credit conditions may depend on the nature of the 
financial intermediation process. This response is captured by the coefficient β3 in equation 
(2) of our stylised model. Second, the size and speed of the response of market interest 
rates to monetary policy interest rates, measured by the coefficient δ1 in equation (4), can be 
affected. Third, market interest rates and credit conditions may be influenced by other factors 
than monetary policy. This is illustrated by the terms β4zt and δ2xt in the model. The 
frequency, size and persistence of this influence can be of fundamental importance for 
monetary conditions in the economy as already noted. 
What is known about these factors? Singh et al (2007) contains a thorough review of the 
literature relating to the second issue, the pass-through from policy interest rates to market 
rates, as well as original empirical results comparing economies with different degrees of 
financial development. The empirical results suggest that “countries with more developed 
financial markets – in terms of higher levels of bank competitiveness and breadth and depth 
of bond and equity markets – tend to have stronger interest rate pass-through”. Results are 
also consistent with the view that the speed of adjustment of market rates to policy rates is 
faster in economies with more developed financial markets. 
Regarding the magnitude and speed of the effect of interest rate changes on aggregate 
demand, it is well known that in economies where mortgage lending is predominantly based 
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on floating rates the impact of interest rate changes is felt faster than in economies where 
fixed rate mortgages are more common. It is also possible that other aspects of the financial 
system impact the sensitivity of aggregate demand to interest rate changes, and it would be 
useful to investigate this possibility in a systematic cross-country study. Important as cross-
country differences in financial systems may be, however, it is likely that changes in the 
financial system within a country will proceed relatively slowly. In this case the central bank 
will have time to adjust its monetary policy strategy accordingly, and the disruption to 
macroeconomic stability will be minor. 
The third empirical issue concerns the importance of shocks in the credit market itself for 
macroeconomic outcomes. I will not attempt to survey the very large empirical literature on 
this subject, but rather use two examples to illustrate that such shocks can be significant. In 
an influential early study Friedman and Kuttner (1993) used standard VAR analysis to 
estimate the effects of shocks in the intermediation sector on economic activity. Results 
pointed to significant influences of shocks to bank capital on the spread between interest 
rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills, and significant influences of default risk 
shocks (as proxied by the spread between interest rates on commercial paper with different 
risk ratings) on output. These effects are closely related to what we have denoted β4zt and 
δ2xt in the stylised model. 
Lown and Morgan (2006) use data on bank lending standards collected by the Federal 
Reserve to study the effects of variations in non-price lending terms on loan volumes and 
economic activity, in other words whether other variables than interest rates have an impact 
on output. Their VAR estimates imply that “[i]nnovations in standards account for nearly a 
third of the error variance in output at four quarters, even more than is attributable to 
innovations in the federal funds rate”. (p 1583). Like those of Friedman and Kuttner, these 
results indicate that the developments in the financial intermediation sector can have 
important macroeconomic effects, and that these should be taken into account in monetary 
policy decisions, the topic of the next section. 
3.4  Changes in financial intermediation and the conduct of monetary policy 
Based on our analytical framework it is now time to discuss the implications of changes in 
financial intermediation for the conduct of monetary policy. Following standard practice, let us 
assume that the objective of the monetary authority is to minimise a loss function that 
depends on the current and discounted future deviations of the inflation rate from its target 
value as well as on the current and discounted values of the economy’s output gap. Let us 
further assume that financial intermediation plays a significant role in the economy along the 
lines discussed above. It then follows trivially from equations (5) and (6) that when the central 
bank decides on the policy interest rate it must take into account all shocks in the system, 
including those specific to the financial intermediation sector, as well as the parameters and 
functions that determine the response of the economy to these shocks. Changes in the 
process of financial intermediation that lead to changes in the speed and magnitude of the 
response of aggregate demand to loan rates and that bring about changes in the pass-
through of policy interest rates to commercial loan rates must be factored into the monetary 
policy decisions. 
As the output gap and the inflation rate also depend on all shocks in the economy, including 
those associated with the process of financial intermediation, it may be argued that a central 
bank which pays attention only to these ultimate target variables as suggested by the Taylor 
rule will automatically react appropriately to shocks and structural changes in the economy. 
Hence the question in the sub-title of this section: “Is the Taylor rule enough?”. 
If we interpret the Taylor rule broadly enough, the answer must be yes. For if the policy 
reaction of the central bank depends on the current level as well as forecasts of (all) future 
levels of the inflation and output gaps, then it follows trivially that the policy interest rate will 
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since to be made operational the forecasts of future inflation and output gaps must be made 
on the basis of currently observed variables. Furthermore, the beauty of the Taylor rule 
presumably is that it is meant to reduce the complexity of the decision problem for the central 
bank. And indeed, as it is most often interpreted, the rule suggests that a robust policy 
response would be a stable function of the current output gap and the expected deviation of 
the inflation rate from the target at some fixed horizon, often taken to be around two years. 
Central banks which publish forecasts of inflation at a particular horizon presumably do so 
because they believe that focusing on this horizon provides a good summary of the relevant 
information to which they need to react. 
Cast in these terms then, the relevant question is whether a Taylor rule as represented in 
equation (3) is general enough to capture most of the information a central bank needs to 
pay attention to, or whether additional variables could have a useful role to play. Following 
the previous analysis, we will discuss this with reference to how changes in financial 
intermediation may influence three aspects of the policy rule: the size of the reaction 
coefficients, the horizon of the inflation forecast, and the possible inclusion of additional 
variables in the rule. 
Changes in the sensitivity of the economy to interest rate movements would not require 
significant modifications in central bank reactions to incoming information, as it would only 
have to adjust the size of the interest rate response. Arguably, changes in the interest rate 
sensitivity of the economy would occur only gradually, so the risk of monetary policy going 
significantly off target is likely to be small. This conclusion is reinforced once it is recognised 
that our knowledge of the size of the impact of policy on inflation and economic activity is in 
any case relatively imprecise. 
A potentially somewhat more significant change in the practice of monetary policy could be 
required if the speed of transmission of interest rate changes is altered as a result of 
changes in the intermediation process. Many inflation-targeting central banks describe their 
decision making process in terms of setting the policy interest rates so as to hit the inflation 
target at a specific horizon, typically that which corresponds to the presumed lag in the effect 
of monetary policy. If this lag becomes shorter, say, it is possible that policy reactions would 
be out of phase, requiring ex post explanations of why the target was missed. Again, to the 
extent that changes in the speed of transmission occur gradually, there would be 
opportunities for the central bank to adjust its reaction as evidence of the structural change 
accumulates. For central banks that communicate policy decisions with respect to a 
particular target horizon, it could become awkward if changes in this horizon were relatively 
frequent. It is perhaps for this reason that some central banks refrain from committing 
themselves to hitting the inflation target at any particular horizon. 
Arguably the most important issue with respect to the adequacy of the Taylor rule as a 
complete guide for central bank policy is whether other variables than the inflation and output 
gaps should be included. Recently this debate has centred on whether or not monetary 
aggregates carry more information about future inflation and output gaps than what is 
already incorporated in the traditional variables in the Taylor rule.
13 In a context where the 
financial intermediation sector of the economy has a significant effect on macroeconomic 
outcomes, it may be argued that monetary and credit aggregates, interest spreads, and 
asset prices would be potentially useful indicators in a policy reaction function.
14 
                                                  
13   See, for example, Reynard (2007) and Woodford (2007). 
14  See Cecchetti et al (2000). Note that a variable may figure in a central bank’s policy reaction function even 
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For example, a shock or a structural change that increases the credit extended by the 
banking system would in the first instance, i.e. before it had any effect on output and inflation, 
probably reduce credit spreads, increase asset prices, and increase the volume of money 
and credit in the economy. A central bank that adjusted its policy interest rate in response to 
these developments would act in a more timely fashion than one that looked only at the 
inflation rate and the output gap. The difficulty of course is that asset prices and monetary 
and credit aggregates respond not only to shocks in the financial intermediation sector but 
also to most other shocks in the economy. The central bank is hence faced with the usual 
signal extraction problem, which would prevent any automatic reaction to such variables. In 
the same way that the Taylor rule calls for different reactions to output movements 
depending on whether the economy has been subject to a demand or a supply shock, 
responses to financial aggregates, asset prices, and credit spreads would have to take into 
account the sources of movements in these variables, a difficult, but perhaps not always an 
impossible task. 
In view of these considerations, a prudent conclusion to this section may be that following a 
Taylor rule may be a necessary but not a sufficient strategy for achieving the goal of price 
stability with minimal fluctuations in output. It is necessary because forceful policy reactions 
(i.e. strong enough to increase real interest rates when inflation threatens to exceed the 
target) would be needed to stabilise inflation when it deviates from the target rate. It is not 
sufficient, however, because structural changes in financial markets may require adjustments 
over time in the size of the reactions to inflation and the output gap as well as to the implicit 
equilibrium real policy rate. Furthermore, smoother paths of inflation and output might be 
obtained if attention was paid to financial variables that carry information about the 
underlying shocks in the economy. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
Extending the scope of financial intermediation in an economy by means of having a greater 
number of firms involved, a greater variety of firms, and a greater variety of assets has been 
shown to impact the conduct of monetary policy in terms of both operating procedures and 
reacting to economic events. While it can be argued that documented changes in the 
financial system have made operating procedures more flexible and efficient, the same 
changes pose challenges for central banks in the day to day management of policy levers. 
The analysis suggests that innovations in financial markets may change both the neutral 
policy interest rate and the horizon of the relevant inflation forecast in a Taylor-type rule. A policy 
maker who does not take this into account would potentially set the interest rate at an 
inappropriate level. However, even if interest rate policies of many central banks are 
characterised (and judged) as if they are (should be) set according to a Taylor rule, it is 
unlikely that, as a practical matter, central banks conduct monetary policy strictly according 
to a rigid interpretation of this rule with a fixed horizon and fixed coefficients. Monetary 
authorities are constantly learning about the structure of the economy and its implication for 
interest rate policy. Consequently there are reasons to be optimistic that monetary policy 
resolutely focused on price stability will continue to be successful even in the presence of 
continuous innovations in financial markets. 
This being said, there is nevertheless a case for moving away from the notion of a fixed 
horizon for the attainment of an inflation target and for taking account of monetary, credit, 
and asset market indicators in the conduct of monetary policy to a greater extent than has 
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